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Abstract. Fourth Generation (4G) wireless networks allow ubiquitous
pervasive data and voice connections for mobile users. Users will no
longer have a single relationship with one access provider, but a relation-
ship with a Biller or Agent which enables them access to the 4G world.
The role of the Biller is to negotiate with providers that users have re-
quested a service from. This situation gives rise to a number of security
and trust issues between the 4G participants. The contribution of this
paper is the proposal of a security architecture that provides informed
consent for users and providers, per unit billing and per use billing with
non-repudiation. We provide an informal analysis of the performance and
security of this new architecture.
1 Introduction
The mobile communications industry is facing a massive paradigm shift with the
emergence of Fourth Generation (4G) networks [8], or Beyond 3G networks as
they are now referred to by the IEEE [12]. These networks will be extremely fast
(upto 100Mbit in motion and 1Gbit while stationary) packet-switched networks,
providing end-to-end IP connectivity via any available wireless access provider [4,
13]. The network will utilise Internet standard Voice Over IP (VoIP) protocols to
provide rich multimedia telephony services, support seamless mobility between
networks, and give access to an unlimited number of Providers. Users will no
longer have a single relationship with a monolithic provider, but maintain a
relationship with a Biller, or Agent which enables them access to any provider
in the 4G world [5].
For example, the User may make use of a location based informational service
that provides answers to queries such as “Where is the nearest post office?” Such
a service may invoke per use transactions with the Application Provider and a
Location Provider, as well as a per kilobyte data service from an Access Provider.
Each of these three Providers will need to be remunerated by the User’s Biller,
with each service producing an entry on the User’s invoice.
4G networks will require a flexible, fraud resistent billing and remuneration
system [2]. In addition, a mechanism will be needed to enforce the conditions of
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sale and ensure that no one party gains an unfair advantage during the trans-
action. The billing system will operate in an environment where the Biller does
not have administrative control over the network. Also, the Biller cannot con-
trol what Providers exist and what services are provided, similar to the Internet
paradigm.
Furthermore, the User wants assurance that fraudulent transactions cannot
be injected into the billing system and that all transactions attributed to their
account have been explicitly authorised by them and that the Biller has endorsed
the transaction.
Additionally, any scheme that is proposed must be able to operate on wireless
handheld devices with limited computing power. Therefore, any billing architec-
ture should minimise the number of public key cryptographic operations that are
required of the User. Unfortunately, it is not possible to completely remove pub-
lic key operations due to the requirement of providing non-repudiation qualities
to the transaction authorisation requests.
Another aspect to be addressed is that in 4G networks the traditional charg-
ing structures of per minute or per byte will be supplemented with new structures
based on Quality of Service (QoS) and type of application used [6,7]. These new
paradigms require that billing systems be flexible yet enforcible.
The Biller, User and Provider all have different risks and threats associated
with them. Predominately, each entity is more concerned with a loss of integrity
in the financial transactions, rather than a breach of confidentiality.
The User is only concerned with being charged for something which they did
not request or authorise. However, the other two entities have a broader range of
threats. The Biller does not want to pay a Provider for a transaction that cannot
be attributed to a User, at the same time, the Biller wants to be sure that each
transaction is accountable. The Provider does not want to provide a service
to a User without being remunerated for that service. Therefore, the Provider
requires the legally binding assurance of the Biller that this remuneration will
occur.
1.1 Previous Work
Current mobile customers are tied to a single network operator that handles all
aspects of a call including charging or billing. While roaming agreements exist,
these are contractual agreements between operators and do not concern the User.
Furthermore, the User is exposing their personally identifiable information and
credentials to each foreign network that they roam on to. At present roaming
does not impact the User financially as they will be charged the same rate by
their provider if they were on their provider’s network or a visiting network. The
exception is Global Roaming however which incurs a different fee structure, but
that fee structure is levied by the customers Home Network and is known in
advance by the customer. However, in 4G networks roaming is controlled by the
User, and charges are stipulated by the Provider and not the Biller, the User
must possess a means of showing they are aware of the charges and that they
have agreed to the charges.
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Ghys and Vaaraniemi proposed an architecture in [3] that allowed a Customer
to maintain a single relationship with a Retailer that allowed access to any
number of Merchants. Unfortunately, their solution only provided for the billing
of sessions and was not concerned with any per use type application like would
exist in M-Commerce. A second limitation that the Ghys Vaaraniemi protocol
exhibits is that the Customer is unable to show their acceptance of the charges
levied against then by the various Merchants. It is assumed that the Merchants
and the Retailer would act honourably on behalf of the Customer.
Hash chains have been proposed as a means of providing undeniable metering
for roaming mobile devices by Zhou and Lam in [14]. In their protocol the
Client generates a hash chain and provides the Home Network (HN) and Foreign
Network (FN) with the last link in the chain. Then, while a call is in progress
the client periodicially releases the previous link in the chain to the FN at a
predetermined interval. This way, the FN cannot misrepresent the length of a
call as it is computationally infeasible to recreate the hash chain without the
first link. We will make use of the Zhou Lam protocol to address the problem
of undeniable metering in 4G networks and the implementation of that protocol
will be discussed below. Unfortunately, the Zhou Lam protocol does not provide
a mechanism for proving that all involved parties have been informed of the
charges and that the charges have been authorised.
Hash chains however are not the only way of providing undeniable metering.
One other approach has involved installing a piece of trusted code on the Client
device that has been certified by a Meter Inspections Authority (MIA). All
entities in the system simply trust that the code provided by the MIA operates
fairly [9]. Unfortunately this approach does not seem practical as the meter
would require low level cooperation with the devices operating system, which is
unlikely to be provided.
Fair exchange protocols were designed to allow commerce between two mu-
tually distrusting parties as would typically occur in an e-commerce situation.
These protocols ensure that no party can gain an advantage by misbehaving,
misrepresenting, or aborting the protocol [10]. Ray and Ray in [10] compare a
number of implementations of fair exchange protocols and highlight the various
advantages and disadvantages of those approaches. The best approach for 4G
networks is an Optimistic Protocol such as proposed by Boyd and Foo in [1].
An optimistic protocol (or offline protocol) is useful when the Merchant and
Customer usually operate honourably. In the optimistic protocol the trusted
third party only becomes involved when a dispute has occured between the Mer-
chant and Customer, thus improving efficiency and reducing the computational
requirements on the Customer. However, in a 4G environment the situation is
different in that the Customer is not supplying payment to the Merchant because
the Biller controls the payments. Despite the payer being different, the idea of
using the Biller as a trusted escrow agent is valuable and beneficial.
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1.2 Our Solution
This paper contributes a new secure architecture for remuneration and billing
in 4G networks. Three protocols are introduced as part of the architecture:
Informed Consent (IC), Per Use Billing, and Per Unit Billing. A 4G User will
make use of the IC protocol as well as the Per Use protocol or Per Unit protocol,
depending on the service being used. Our solution uses public key cryptography
to ensure chargeable events are undeniably attributed to the correct User.
The IC protocol ensures that each party has acknowledged and authorised
the transaction to occur. No party can claim that they did not agree to the
quoted cost of a service. By acknowledging the cost of a service the User accepts
responsibility of payment to the Biller and the Biller acknowledges their require-
ment to remunerate the Provider on behalf of the User. As the IC protocol is
required to supply undeniability of transactions it makes strong use of public
key signatures. Public key signatures supply a non-repudiation quality as they
are impossible to produce without the active involvement of the signer. There-
fore, the presence of an accurately signed signature implies that the User was
undeniably aware or involved.
Per Use billing occurs when a User purchases a tangible electronic product
such as a ring tone, wallpaper, or retrieves information that may need to be
paid for. We utilise a fair exchange protocol for Per Use billing to ensure that
all parties behave fairly and no one party gains an unfair advantage. On the
other hand, Per Unit billing occurs when a service involves sessions, such as
making a telephone call or accessing an IP data service. To address Per Unit
billing we make use of the irreversible nature of hash chains. Hash chains supply
an undeniability and verifiable metering ability where no trustworthy point of
metering exists.
Our solution also allows the User to remain anonymous to the Provider if
they desire. The Provider is aware of the SessionID and is provided with an
encrypted form of the User’s identity for use during a dispute. However, in a
normal protocol run the Provider should never know the Users identity. The
Biller is responsible for maintaining a record of what SessionID’s relate to what
User.
1.3 Outline of Paper
This paper will first give an overview of the proposed architecture and protocol,
then consider the dependencies and assumptions. Following this the functionality
of the architecture will be detailed and a number of use cases discussed to give an
example of how the protocol will operate. Lastly, the protocol will be analysed
against the desired functionality and the limitations discussed, along with a
discussion of the performance of the architecture with respect to the number of
operations required per transaction.
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2 Threats and Security Requirements
While the complete 4G architecture would have numerous threats on the system,
this paper deals specifically with the billing and remuneration components. The
trust relationships in the billing system are asymmetric in nature as while one
party may trust the other that trust may not necessarily be reciprocal. That
said, each entity fears a loss of integrity the most.
The User may wish to remain anonymous and therefore should not be forced
to provide their identity to the Provider. The User is also wary of the Provider’s
ability to supply the requested service and as such requires assurances that the
product has been supplied before final payment occurs. However, the User does
trust the Provider to supply an honest quote for the requested service as the
Provider sets the price. For example, the User is reliant on the Provider to charge
realistic prices, however the User does have the power to refuse a transaction and
walk away from the sale. The User does not fully trust the Biller either as the
Biller could invoice the User a greater amount than what the Provider charged,
therefore incurring an unfair advantage.
Secondly, the Biller does not trust the Provider because it is in the Provider’s
best interest to cause the Biller to remunerate the Provider at a higher rate
than what it cost the Provider to provide the service (the amount the User was
charged). Also, the Biller does not trust the User for similar reasons in that it is
in the User’s best interest to cause the Biller to allow a service to be provided
without a User being invoiced correctly.
Lastly, the Provider partially trusts the Biller as the Provider is dependant
on the Biller for remuneration and as a means for establishing trust with the
User. However, the Biller could withold remuneration from the Provider so the
Provider must be protected against this behaviour. Furthermore, the Provider
only indirectly trusts the User (care of the Biller). The Provider also trusts that
the User wants to use the service offered, but strong trust is not required here
as the User does not pay the Provider as the Biller bears that responsibility.
A strong authentication mechanism will be needed so that a verifiable means
of attributing an event to a User can be provided. This attribution is vitally
important to provide integrity and non-repudiation which are well known to be
irrevocable requirements of good transaction systems.
Having established the requirements we now propose the following new billing
and remuneration architecture as a solution to the 4G billing problem.
3 Secure Billing Architecture
There are always three entities in a 4G transaction: the User, the Provider and
the Biller. It is likely however, that in most real life situations a User may be
involved in multiple simultaneous transactions and it is important that these
transactions remain atomic. Figure 1 shows how the Biller handles all the fi-
nancial transactions between the Provider and User. However, as each Provider
has a different charging rate and structure it is vitally important that there
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is a verifiable way of undeniably obtaining a User’s informed consent to those
charges prior to providing a service. It is also vitally important that there is
an enforceable mechanism to ensure that the Provider supplies the requested
service, that the User will be billed for only that service, and that the Provider
will be remunerated by the User’s Biller.
Fig. 1. 4G Billing Architecture
Providing this functionality is the purpose of the three protocols: Informed
Consent, Per Use Billing, and Per Unit Billing. For each and every transaction
two of the three protocols will be used. The IC protocol ensures that each entity
is aware of the charges and that all entities are in agreeance to the charges and
accept the responsibility of payment or provision of service as appropriate. Once
this has occured either the per use or per unit protocol is used depending upon
the type of application being billed. An application with a tangible electronic
product such as a ringtone, wallpaper, or informational service would use the
Per Use protocol, whereas a session type application such as an IP data session
or telephone call would utilise the Per Unit protocol.
Each protocol requires that the User perform only 4 public key operations
in total which the authors believe to be an acceptable number even for low
powered mobile devices. A description and discussion of the three protocols will
be presented here along with the necessary assumptions and definitions.
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3.1 Definitions and Notation
As a number of cryptographic operations are required to be performed, and a
number of different messages sent between the involved parties the following
notations and abbreviations have been used:
U The User
P The Provider (Access, Service, Location, Etc)
B The Biller
Prod A tangible electronic Product
j Number of links remaining in a hash chain.
n A secure random nonce
m The maximum number of links in a hash chain
CertX A public key certificate signed by an appropriate CA for an entity, X
EX(M) Public key encryption of a message, M , with X’s public key
EXY (M) Symmetric key encryption of a message, M , with X and Y ’s secret key
KXY Symmetric key shared between X and Y
SigX(M) Standard signature of a message, M , signed with X’s private key
H(M) One way hash fuction of a message M
Hx(M) One way hash of a message, M , repeated x times creating a hash chain
X → Y :M A message, M , sent from X to Y
3.2 Assumptions
As public key cryptography performs a number of operations in the protocol it
is assumed a public key infrastructure (PKI) exists. However, it is not assumed
that such a PKI is wide reaching and generic. We assume that an appropriate
international telecommunications body would act as the root certificate author-
ity (CA) and that regional regulatory authorities are responsible for providing
certification to Billers. Figure 2 shows the structure of such a certificate chain.
It is not required that Providers be registered with the Biller or the Biller’s CA.
All that is required of a Provider is to possess a certificate signed by a CA of
reputable reputation.
The reason the Biller is required to possess a certificate from such a tightly
controlled structure is to provide assurance to both Users and Providers that the
Biller is operating under appropriate regulatory oversight and approval. Posses-
sion of a signed certificate indicates the Biller is licensed to provide 4G ser-
vices. This certificate would likely be issued in conjunction with the appropriate
telecommunication carrier license as required by individual regional authorities.
Therefore, significant care should be taken by the regulatory authority in issuing
certificates to Billers and it is assumed that a reasonable degree of identification
is provided and that liability is accepted by the Biller. However, to foster growth
in the 4G market the regulatory framework should not place an undue burden
on the Biller.
Futhermore, it is assumed that the User’s public and private keys have been
securely issued to them by the Biller and that the User is capable of storing
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Fig. 2. PKI Structure
their private key securely. The method of registration is not important but it is
likely to require the User prove their identity to the Biller to a level sufficient
to satisfy the regional regulator. In addition to the public/private key pair, a
long term symmetric secret key also exists between the Biller and the User for
use when non-repudiation is not required. Therefore, it is also assumed that this
secret key is also distributed and stored securely.
Network authentication between the User and the Biller is important to pre-
vent fraud and impersonation attacks. It is assumed that an effective authentica-
tion mechanism is used to support non-repudiation. This mechanism will need to
be resistent to network based attacks. Such an authentication mechanism maybe
based on identity based cryptography such as in [11]. This authentication pro-
cess is assumed to occur during roaming events (handover or handoff) as well as
during session initiation and establishment.
It is assumed that entities would not engage in an activity that was not in
their best interests. For example, the Provider would not provide 10 minutes
worth of service and claim to the Biller that only 2 minutes were used. In ad-
dition, it is assumed that the Biller can be trusted not to collude with either
the Provider or the User. This assumption will be somewhat enforced by market
forces. If a Biller has a reputation as being untrustworthy a Provider is unlikely
to honour a request for service by Users of that Biller.
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3.3 The Protocols
Having outlined the security requirements and the underlying assumptions we
will now introduce the three protocols that make up the billing and remuneration
architecture and provide step by step examples of their operation.
Informed Consent and Authorisation The User must possess a means
of showing they are aware of the charges and that they have agreed to the
charges. Furthermore, the User’s Biller must also authorise the transaction as
the Provider is remunerated by the Biller, not the User. In fact, the User will
have no financial obligation to the Provider because the Biller bears that re-
sponsibility. Figure 3 shows how the authorisation protocol will operate.
Fig. 3. Informed Consent and Authorisation
Step One. Request for Service This step begins the informed consent process, it
is assumed that prior to this step the User knows what service or goods they
wish to purchase. The User sends:
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U → P : Req, ServId, SessId, CertB ,
EB(userid, SigU (Req, ServId, SessId)),
SigU (Req, ServId, SessId)
Step Two. Request for Authorisation The Provider verifies that the request is
accurately formed and prepares the following request and forwards it to the
User’s Biller which is determined by the Biller’s signed certificate provided by
the User:
P → B : Req, ServId, SessId, CertP , Cost,
EB(userid, SigU (Req, ServId, SessId)),
SigP (Req, ServId, SessId, Cost)
Step Three. Request for Confirmation The Biller verifies the Provider’s signature,
then decrypts the message from the User to determine the User’s credentials and
to verify that the User has signed the request correctly. The Biller then prepares
the request to be sent to the User to get confirmation of the cost as shown here:
B → U : EUB(Req, ServId, SessId, ProvId, Cost),
SigP (Req, ServId, SessId, Cost)
Step Four. Acceptance of Cost The User can verify the Provider’s signature of
the transaction details if User does not trust the Biller, however it is likely that
the User trusts the Biller and this step can be ommitted. The User acknowledges
their acceptance of the charges by signing the message sent by the Biller and
returning it to the Biller:
U → B : SigU (Req, ServId, SessId, ProvId, Cost)
However, if the User is not happy with the transaction they can terminate
the protocol here without penalty by not providing this acknowledgement.
Step Five. Authorisation The Biller verifies the signature to prove that the User
has accepted the charges quoted by the Provider. The Biller may now perform
any necessary credit checks and regulatory checks, such as age or eligibility, and
if satisfied, provide the Provider with the following final authorisation:
B → P : SigB(Req, ServId, SessId, ProvId, Cost)
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Step Six. Perform Operation At this stage all three parties have agreed on the
cost of the transaction and have provided their authorisation for the transaction
or session to begin. The Provider and the User may now commence service.
The protocol used to supply this service will depend on the way the service is
charged, either per use or per unit.
Per Use Billing This protocol operates at Step Six of the informed consent
protocol shown before.
Per service billing occurs when the User whishes to purchase a tangible elec-
tronic product such as a ringtone, wallpaper, or information type service. The
delivery of these types of products needs a protocol that ensures neither the
Provider or the User can complete the transaction without the other also com-
pleting the transaction. This protocol has been modelled on the Boyd Foo fair
exchange protocol [1], however the protocol has been modified considerably to
fit within the 4G architecture.
Step One. Send Product The Provider sends the product to the User like so:
P → U : EPU (Prod), SigP (EPU (Prod))
and the corresponding symmetric key and signature to the Biller:
P → B : EB(KPU ), SigP (KPU ), SigP (EPU (Prod))
Step Two. Verify and Acknowledge The User can verify the encrypted product
against the supplied signature. If the signature is correct the User acknowledges
receipt by sending the following signature to the Biller:
U → B : SigU (EPU (Prod))
Step Three. Payment The Biller compares SigU (EPU (Prod)) and SigP (EPU (Prod))
and if the signed hashes match then releases the key to the User:
B → U : EBU (KPU )
and sends the Users’s signature to the Provider so that the Provider can
make their own validations.
B → P : SigU (EPU (Prod))
At this stage the Biller remunerates the Provider and invoices the User.
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Per Unit Billing As with per use billing, this protocol is designed to run at
Step 6 of the IC protocol after the amount to be charged per unit, what unit
will be charged, and at what size per unit has been decided.
Providing an undeniable way of metering and recording a User’s usage is one
of the biggest challenges in 4G billing and remuneration as the Biller cannot
trust the Provider or the User to provide reliable metering. Hash chains are well
suited to this challenge as they are extremely efficient to create on the User’s
device, yet computationally infeasible to produce fraudulently. The protocol’s
strength comes from the inability to create the hash chain without knowing the
previous links. However, the protocol also requires that both the Provider and
the User make their own independent measurements to assure themselves that
the other is not cheating.
Step One. Generate Hash Chain The User chooses a random value n and pro-
duces a hash chain of m links storing each link securely, such that:
Hm(n) = H(Hi−1(n))(i = 1, 2, . . . ,m)
Once the hash chain is prepared the User can then send the following to the
Provider and the Biller:
U → P : m,Hm(n), SigU (m,Hm(n))
Once the Provider has the last link in the chain they are able to establish
the session and begin providing the agreed upon service.
Step Two. Metering After the agreed upon unit has elapsed the User is required
to send the previous link in the chain to the Provider, ie Hj−1(n) where the
currrent link is Hj(n).
The Provider is able to terminate the session if the link is not sent or if a
fraudulent link is substituted. The Provider can check for fraudulent links by
ensuring that:
H(Hj−1(n)) = Hj(n)
and that
Hi(Hj(n)) = Hm(n)(i = m− j,m− j + 1,m− j + 2, . . . ,m− 1,m)
Where j is the number of units recorded and Hj(n) is the currently stored
hash.
The Provider stores Hj−1(n) as the new value of Hj(n) when satisfied that
the User is being honest.
Step Two is repeated at the beginning of each unit for the duration of the
session.
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Step Three. Billing After the session is terminated the Provider sends the billing
information to the Biller like so:
P → B : SessId, j,m,Hm(n),Hj(n),
SigP (SessId, j,m,Hm(n),Hj(n))
and the User also sends the Biller:
U → B : SessId, j,m,Hm(n),Hj(n),
SigU (SessId, j,m,Hm(n),Hj(n))
The Biller is able to calculate that:
Hi(Hj(n)) = Hm(n)(i = m− j,m− j + 1,m− j + 2, . . . ,m− 1,m)
Using the values form, j,Hj(n),Hm(n) supplied by the Biller and the Provider.
If both equations are equal then the metering is correct and no dispute is ap-
parent. The User is charged for the call and the Provider is remunerated during
regular funds transfer.
Step Four. Dispute Resolution The Provider would have been able to detect an
incorrect chain link during the session and would have terminated the session if
this occurred. As the units are prepaid the Provider would have not experienced
a loss and would have been able to supply the previously correct hash chain link
to the Biller for remuneration. When this dispute occurs the provided value of
Hj(n) would differ between the User and Provider. The Biller will be forced to
honour the most recent, accurate hash provided to it, which in this case would
be the that of the Provider.
Although, it is unlikey that a dispute would have occurred for a number
of reasons. Firstly, the only entity that could provide an accurate hash, other
than the correct hash, is the User. But, this would cause the User to incur a
greater charge than if they had acted honourably. Secondly, the Provider is able
to terminate a session if the User does not supply a hash at the correct time,
or supplies an inaccurate hash. In both cases, it is unlikely to reach the dispute
resolution stage.
4 Discussion
The three protocols presented in this paper work in conjunction with the wider
4G architecture to meet the requirements and provide the necessary funcational-
ity to enable secure billing and remuneration in 4G networks. The two important
factors to consider when analysing the protocols is how they perform, and how
they address the threats that have been determined.
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4.1 Performance
Unfortunately the protocols have not been implemented to a level that enables
delay and processing times to be recorded. However, it is possible to make some
observations by investigating the number of, and the type of opertaions being
performed during a transaction. It is understood that public key encryption and
decryption takes the most time, and hashing takes the least, with symmetric
key encryption located between the two. Furthermore, signature creation and
verification requires a hash function and a public key operation. Table 1 lists the
number of operations required for each protocol per entity.
Consent Per Use Per Unit
U P B U P B U P B
Asymmetric Encryptions/Decryptions 3 3 4 1 4 1 1 2 3
Hashes 2 2 3 1 3 1 m+ 1 2 3
Symmetric Encryptions/Decryptions 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0
Table 1. Number of Operations Performed Per Protocol Per Entity
As Table 1 shows, the informed consent protocol requires the User to perform
three (3) public key operations per protocol run which may have a noticeable
performance impact. However, due to the requirement to provide strong non-
repudiation of the transaction authorisation it is unavoidable. Although, recent
developments in hand held technology have resulted in devices with significant
computing power that the delay experienced while performing these operations
is unlikely to be severe. The Per Use protocol only requires one (1) public key op-
eration which is not unreasonable. The Per Unit protocol requires one (1) public
key operation as well as the creation of a hash chain. Creating the hash chain will
mean m + 1 hashes need to be created, but hash creation is a computationally
inexpensive operation. Even though Step Two of the Per Unit protocol occurs
multiple times, this does not incur any additional cryptographic operations.
4.2 Security
While an indepth mathematical proof of all three protocols is beyond the scope
of the paper it is possible to obtain a reasonable understanding of the security
offered by the protocols by examining how the underlying primitives are used
and what the rationale was behind some of the design decisions.
Informed Consent Ensuring that the User remains in control of transactions
was an important requirement and the informed consent protocol presented here
addresses that requirement. The protocol requires the Provider to provide a
quote for the requested service to the Biller. The Biller ensures that the User
actually requested the service, and that the user has authorised the request. The
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informed consent protocol makes strong use of the non-repudiation qualities of
public key cryptography which is necessary when the protocol involves financial
transactions.
This protocol relies on the fact that all money will only flow through the
Biller and therefore is in a position of trust to both parties. This is one of the
reasons why the charges are accepted between the Biller and the User and not
the Provider. Structuring the protocol this way was necessary to ensure that
neither of the two untrusted parties (the Provider or the User) were able to
claim that they were not aware of the charges quoted, and that they did not
know if the User wished to proceed or not.
Per Use Billing When the User purchases a tangible electronic product from a
Provider, and after the informed consent protocol has run the Provider supplies
the User with the product requested, however that product has been encrypted
with a symmetric key KPU known only to the Provider at this stage. The User
can verify that the encrypted product has not been altered by an attacker how-
ever to perform this verification at this stage would be unnecesary overhead. The
encryption key is also supplied securely to the User’s Biller along with a copy of
the signature of the encrypted product that was supplied to the User.
The protocol now waits for the User to compute a signature of the encrypted
product and send it to the Biller. If the User does not compute this signature
within a reasonable period of time the Provider can assume the User has reneged
on the transaction and drop the session. However, if the User was honest and
computed the signature, the Biller is able to compare the contents of the signa-
tures provided by both the User and Provider. If the signatures match the Biller
is able to release the encryption key stored in escrow to the User. The Biller also
supplies the Provider with the User supplied signature at this stage so that the
Provider has a record of successful and unsuccessful transactions.
Per Unit Billing Providing an undeniable means of metering when both ends
of the session are untrusted was the most difficult problem to overcome. The
hash chain solution was elegant and provided sufficient assurance with little to
no computational overhead for the User. The strength of the solution comes from
the inability to create previous links in the hash chain without the knowledge of
the first element (which is kept secret). It appears that the User is trusted in the
scheme as the User is the source of the hash chain, however this is not fully the
case. Even though the User is trusted to provide the hash chain, if the Provider
detects dishonesty it is able to terminate the session without loss as each unit
being metered is paid for in advance.
4.3 Limitations
The system does not address at present who pays for the necessary Authenti-
cation, Authorisation and Accountablity (AAA) traffic. It is likely however that
the traffic will be billed to the Biller who would either absorb the cost as a cost
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of doing business or pass on a fixed service charge to the User. However, it is
granted that the Biller has no verifiable way of knowing if the AAA charge levied
against it was accurate and developing a protocol for ensuring accurate AAA
traffic measurements is an avenue for future work.
Another limitation is that the protocols do not yet address the newer charging
structures such as QoS based charging. While these have not been included yet,
it is trivial to extend the architecture to support them. Therefore, we leave the
implementation of QoS based charging for future work.
5 Conclusions
4G networks will require a secure billing and remuneration architecture that
provides non-repudiation and integrity to all the actors involved. Furthermore,
the architecture will have to consider the low computational resources available
to wireless handheld devices and acknowledge the fact that the Providers and
Users do not trust each other. The solution proposed in this paper addresses
these concerns with respect to the 4G network model and the threat and trust
relationships that exist in the 4G world. Additionally, the proposed architecture
limits the number of public key operations performed by the User, therefore min-
imising the most computationally intensive of the operations being performed.
While the number of public key operations performed by the User is small,
it may be possible to reduce this further without affecting the security of the
system. Continued refinement of the cryptographic operations performed by the
User is an avenue for future work. Additionally, it would be desirable to im-
plement the architecture so that comparisons could be made between different
cryptographic mecahnisms and a more detailed analysis of the performance im-
pact of different mechanisms can occur.
The viability of 4G networks depends on being able to bill and remuner-
ate securely. This protocol provides the needed functionality and addresses the
threats that are likely to be experienced by 4G entities.
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